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U

nmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) are the wonder
weapons of today’s wars. UCAVs have been credited with striking
the convoy carrying Moammar Qaddafi; killing al Qaeda’s Abu
Yahya al Libi and Anwar al Awlaki; eviscerating the Taliban’s ranks and
other militants in the Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPak) theater; and hitting
targets from Asia to Africa—all without putting pilots in harm’s way.
The drone revolution promises many benefits, but there are also
drawbacks to this nascent unmanned air force—drawbacks that few
policymakers have contemplated. Just as drone detractors need to
acknowledge what UCAVs bring to the table, UCAV advocates need to
acknowledge the negative implications of drone warfare.

Today and Tomorrow

Whatever one’s view of UCAVs, the appeal of drones is understandable. As an Air Force report concludes, drones “are not limited by human
performance or physiological characteristics . . . extreme persistence
and maneuverability are intrinsic benefits.”1 In other words, drones can
handle what humans cannot—G forces and speed, tedium and boredom.
Among the other “intrinsic benefits” of drones: they deprive the enemy
of human targets; they don’t get tired or thirsty or hungry; they are
relatively inexpensive; and with the coming of nuclear-powered drones,
they offer the possibility of nearly endless above-target operation.
It is no surprise, then, that drones are beginning to dislodge manned
aircraft from the crucial role they have played in warfighting since World
War II. Consider some of the evidence:
•• There has been a 1,200-percent increase in combat air patrols by drones
since 2005.2
•• In the past decade, the US drone fleet has swelled from 50 planes to
7,500, though the vast majority of these drones are not UCAVs.3 Still,
drones represent 31 percent of the Pentagon’s air fleet.4
•• America’s unmanned air force—including drones deployed by the
military and the CIA—has struck targets in Pakistan, Iraq, Libya,

1     US Air Force, United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force, May 18, 2009), 15.
2     “Flight of the drones,” The Economist, October 8, 2011.
3     “Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),” The New York Times, October 21,
2011, http://topics.nytimes.com.
4     Spencer Ackerman and Noah Shachtman, “Almost 1 In 3 U.S. Warplanes Is a Robot,” Wired
Danger Room, January 9, 2012.
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Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines.5 UCAVs are so
central to US efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan that some observers
have dubbed this front of the antiterror campaign “the drone war.”
•• Referring to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman
Admiral Michael Mullen declared not long before he retired, “There
are those that see the JSF as the last manned fighter or fighter-bomber.”
Raising more than a few eyebrows, he added, “I’m one that’s inclined
to believe that.”6
Two factors are accelerating the use of drones: the public’s growing
distaste for US casualties and the Pentagon’s shrinking share of the
budget. Regarding the former, it pays to recall the American people’s
tolerance for casualties has waxed and waned over the decades. They
obviously have had a high threshold for casualties at times. For example,
despite far higher casualty levels than recent conflicts, public support
remained high throughout World War II and during much of Vietnam.
However, that changed dramatically after Vietnam. The result was a
quarter-century of push-button, almost-bloodless wars (at least for
Americans), each conditioning the American people to expect less
bloodshed than the previous conflict. This, in turn, conditioned political
and military leaders to deliver more push-button, bloodless wars. The
9/11 attacks briefly broke this cycle, having an effect on the American
public not dissimilar from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Consider a CNN
poll conducted after 9/11 asking Americans if they would support military action even if it meant 5,000 American troops would be killed. As
a sign of their grim, if ephemeral, determination, 76 percent said yes.7
Of course, those attitudes have shifted, predictably, during what
one observer calls “the wars of 9/11.”8 Land wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq have been lengthy and costly, with 4,485 American troops killed in
Iraq and more than 2,147 killed in the still-unfinished Afghanistan war,
America’s longest shooting war. In the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s
no coincidence that UCAVs are playing a central role in US military operations as Americans grow weary of war’s toll. Instead of putting boots
on the ground in Libya, for example, Washington unleashed swarms
of drones. In fact, the missiles that hit Qaddafi’s escaping convoy were
fired not by an artilleryman marching through the desert or an F-18 pilot
prowling overhead, but by a remote-control warrior sitting in the safety
of a nondescript building outside Las Vegas.9 Annual drone strikes in
Pakistan increased from one in 2004 to 117 in 2010, when they peaked.10
The Brookings Institution estimates that as many as 2,769 militants have
been killed by UCAV strikes in Pakistan.11 Today, the frequency and
5     Karen DeYoung, “Secrecy defines Obama’s drone war,” The Washington Post, December 19,
2011; Mark Mazzetti, “The Drone Zone,” The New York Times, July 6, 2012.
6     “Last Manned Aircraft?” Air Force Magazine, May 18, 2009.
7     Jeffrey M. Jones, “Support Remains High Even if Military Action is Prolonged, Involves
Casualties,” Gallup News Service, October 4, 2001, http://www.gallup.com.
8     Simon Serfaty, “The United States, the European Union and NATO: After the Cold War and
Beyond Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Washington DC: CSIS, June
15, 2005).
9     Thomas Harding, “Col. Gaddafi killed: convoy bombed by drone flown by pilot in Las Vegas,”
The London Telegraph, October 20, 2011.
10     Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Pakistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction
& Security (Washington DC: Brookings, December 29, 2011), 6-8.
11     Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Progress and Security in
Post-9/11 Afghanistan (Washington DC: Brookings, December 13, 2012), 32.
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ferocity of US drone strikes in Yemen are following the same escalating
trajectory that characterized the drone war in Pakistan.
As to the Pentagon’s diminishing share of the budget, “Drones, Not
Marines” blared one headline after President Barack Obama unveiled his
plan for scaling-back the US military. Defending the president’s vision
of a smaller military, The New York Times assured its readers that “Many
of the challenges out there can be dealt with by air power, intelligence,
special operations or innovative technologies like drones.”12
Media outlets are getting their cues from the Pentagon. “As
we reduce the overall defense budget,” outgoing Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta explained, “we will protect, and in some cases increase,
our investments in special operations forces, in new technologies like
. . . unmanned systems.”13 Similarly, an Air Force report suggests that
drones promote “the wisest use of tax dollars.”14 A typical Predator
drone, for instance, costs $4.5 million, while an F-35 costs $159 million,
an F-22 $377 million, and a B-2 nearly $2 billion. Moreover, training
UCAV controllers costs less than a tenth what it costs to train traditional
combat aviators.15
In short, the emergence of an unmanned air force is not far away:
•• In addition to its growing fleet of reconnaissance and surveillance
drones, the Army’s Grey Eagle/Sky Warrior drone—sharing bloodlines with the Predator—has been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army is asking industry partners to develop a small, handlaunched drone that can strike targets six miles away.16
•• The Navy is testing a carrier-borne UCAV, the X-47B, which is being
put through its paces aboard the USS Harry S. Truman. (Related, the
Navy is also developing missile-laden robot warships, such as the
unmanned surface vessel precision engagement module.)
•• The Air Force envisions deploying swarms of drones networked
together to “operate in a variety of lethal and non-lethal missions at
the command of a single pilot”17 —as many as five drones per pilot.18
•• The Air Force wants America’s next-generation bomber, the Long
Range Strike bomber, to be “optionally manned.”
•• UCAVs equipped with “target-recognition systems” and “autonomous
attack systems” are on the horizon.19
•• The Pentagon plans to double the drone fleet by 2020, as the size of

12     “A leaner Pentagon,” The New York Times, January 5, 2012.
13     US Department of Defense, “Defense Strategic Guidance Briefing from the Pentagon,”
(Washington DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Transcript),
January 5, 2012, http://www.defense.gov.
14     US Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047, 15.
15     “Flight of the drones.”
16     Spencer Ackerman, “Army Wants Tiny Suicidal Drone to Kill From 6 Miles
Away,” Wired Danger Room, September 10, 2012, http://www.wired.com.
17     US Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047, 39.
18     Andrea Shalal-Esa and Tim Hepher, “Future drone pilots may fly four warplanes at once,”
Reuters, December 24, 2011.
19     Max Boot, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World (New York:
Penguin, 2006), 440-441; Shalal-Esa and Hepher., "Future drone pilots."
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the manned bomber and fighter force shrinks.20
•• In 2011, the Air Force trained more pilots to fly drones than fighter
and bomber pilots combined.21 The Air Force Academy class of 2011
was the first to graduate cadets with specialties in operating drones.
In fact, “Hundreds of Air Force pilots are transitioning to drones
from traditional manned aircraft,” according to an F-15E pilot interviewed for this essay. An Air Force Academy graduate with 20 years in
the Air Force, including hundreds of hours of combat, the pilot concedes that he is biased when it comes to the drone debate, before adding,
“Many of the veteran pilots I know that transitioned to drones were
effectively forced there by having few desirable alternatives.”22
An Air Force report on drones concedes that growth in demand
for unmanned systems has made relying on “experienced pilots” to fly
drones “unsustainable.”23 So the Air Force is tasking personnel with no
flight experience to drone operations, developing a pilot career field with
specialized drone training “distinct from current manned aircraft pilot
training” and planning to task multiple drones to a single operator.24
In addition, the Air Force envisions programs that will increase use
of “computer-based training and virtual instruction. . . . The goal will
be to move all Air Force UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] training
programs to accomplish 75 percent of all training through self-study,
allowing virtual instructors to introduce and practice mission tasks with
students.”25 In other words, not only will the planes be unmanned and
automated, so will the training.
War, as Michael Walzer observes, is “a human action . . . for whose
effects someone is responsible.”26 Yet who is held responsible when
a UAV or UCAV goes AWOL? This is not exactly a rare occurrence.
AWOL drones have crashed in eastern Iran, collided with cargo planes,
smashed into Djibouti neighborhoods, and veered so dangerously off
course and out of control that manned jets have been dispatched to
destroy them. The Air Force concedes that its Predator, Reaper, and
Global Hawk drones crash more than any other aircraft—nine are
lost for every 100,000 hours flown.27 And sounding more like a sci-fi
magazine than a newspaper, The Washington Post reports that a Predator
based in Djibouti “started its engine without any human direction, even
though the ignition had been turned off and the fuel lines closed.”28

20     David Axe, “Pentagon looks to double its unmanned air force,” Wired.com, May 31, 2011,
http://www.wired.com.
21     Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “War evolves with drones, some tiny as bugs,” The
New York Times, June 19, 2011.
22     Confidential interview conducted November 28, 2011; the name of interviewee is withheld
by mutual agreement.
23    U.S. Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047, 28.
24     Ibid., 28; Rachel Martin, “Drone pilots: the future of aerial warfare,” NPR, November 29,
2011.
25     US Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047, 82
26     Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations (NewYork:
Basic Books, 1977), 15.
27     Carlo Munoz, “Report: Drones top list of accident-prone aircraft in Air Force,” The Hill,
June 18, 2012.
28     Craig Whitlock, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations,” The Washington Post, October
25, 2012.
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In short, drones have real technological limitations. These limitations, it seems, will only be amplified as (a) increasing numbers of
nonpilots take the controls and (b) each drone operator is shouldered
with an increasing number of platforms to operate. However, that is not
stopping Washington from deploying more and more of these wonder
weapons.

More Willing to Use

As Michael Ignatieff asked in 2000, years before the drone war
began, “If war becomes unreal to the citizens of modern democracies,
will they care enough to restrain and control the violence exercised
in their name . . . if they and their sons and daughters are spared the
hazards of combat?”29 That question is directly linked to policymakers
in the drone age. The risks policymakers take with UCAVs are greater
because the accountability is less than with manned aircraft. After
all, the loss of a drone is the loss of nothing more than metal. “More
willing to lose is more willing to use,” as Daniel Haulman of the Air
Force Historical Research Agency puts it.30 Yet as America’s deepening
involvement in Yemen underscores, drones may actually make bootson-the-ground intervention more likely. To identify new targets and
authenticate existing targets for the drone war, Washington has quietly
sent US troops into Yemen. According to unnamed military officials,
the contingent of American troops is growing.31 As the troops identify
targets, they become targets. Thus, far from preventing more direct
and riskier forms of military engagement, drones are encouraging such
engagement—even as many of their operators paradoxically carry out
their lethal missions from the safety of bases in Nevada or New Mexico.
Make no mistake: this is a good thing for the airmen kept away from
harm; however, it may be a bad thing for our republic. Because UCAVs
remove humans from the battlespace, they remove the unique characteristics humans bring to the battlespace: deliberation, doubt, fear, gut
instinct, and judgment. We need humans in the battlespace, in harm’s
way, not just because humans make better judgments than machines—
judgment is a very human action—but because having humans in the
battlespace can help the commander-in-chief make better judgments
about when, where, and whether to wage war. The temptation to gain
all the benefits of kinetic military operations with none of the costs,
consequences, or risks may be too strong for the Executive branch to
resist. Even if the Executive’s inclination toward war is not new—recall
Madison’s letter to Jefferson noting how “the Executive is the branch
of power most interested in war and most prone to it”—the prospect of
risk-free war afforded by pilotless planes is.32
This has been decades in the making, of course. From World War II
to Desert Storm to the war on terror, the United States has grown adept
at striking its enemies with increasing levels of precision and decreasing
levels of risk to those pulling the trigger. But UCAVs erase the risk. And
29     Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York: Picador Books, 2000), 4.
30     Daniel L. Haulman, “U.S. Unmanned Vehicles in Combat, 1991-2003,” June 9, 2003,
http://www.dtic.mil.
31     “U.S. escalates clandestine war in Yemen,” Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2012.
32     Cited in James A. Curry, Richard D. Riley, Richard M. Battiston, Constitutional Government: The
American Experience (New York: West Publishing, 1989), 157.

12

Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013

without it, there is one less check on the commander-in-chief’s warmaking power. President Obama, for instance, has employed drones in
Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Iran in ways that he has not—and
arguably would not—employ manned aircraft. The political cost at
home—and diplomatic fallout abroad—is high when a commanderin-chief loses a pilot, but negligible when a commander-in-chief loses
a pilotless drone. Just compare the nonreaction to the loss of drones
in Djibouti, Iran, and the Seychelles under the Obama administration
with the bona fide crises other presidents faced when US pilots were
shot down over or near enemy territory. President Dwight Eisenhower
weathered international humiliation after the Soviets brought down
Francis Powers’ U-2. President John Kennedy was pressed to go to war
when Rudolf Anderson’s U-2 was shot down during the Cuban Missile
Crisis. President Bill Clinton had to deal with a hostage crisis abroad
and a political crisis at home when Michael Durant’s UH-60 Blackhawk
was shot down in Mogadishu, and he was forced to mount a massive
rescue operation into hostile territory when Scott O’Grady’s F-16 was
shot down in Bosnia. In sum, the absence or presence of US personnel
in a military operation dramatically changes the calculus of war.
Not only do UCAVs lower the threshold for going to war, they
also may make it easier to keep wars going, as Paul Miller, a former
National Security Council official, observes. Noting that “endless war
is unacceptable and dangerous,” Miller argues that the institution of the
presidency needs to answer an important question: “When, and under
what conditions, will the U.S. government stop using drones to bomb
suspected terrorists around the world?”33
Thanks to drones, as Miller’s question suggests, “endless war” is
quite possible. In this regard, it’s worth noting that the drone war is
an outgrowth of Washington’s post-9/11 campaign against terrorist
organizations and regimes—a campaign authorized by the Use of Force
Resolution of 18 September 2001. That measure directed the president
“to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.”34
That final clause referring to “future acts of international terrorism” creates a loophole larger than a Reaper ground-attack drone—with
a wingspan of some 66 feet—a loophole that should be tightened
through legislation focusing on threats beyond Afghanistan. After all, it
would be a stretch to say that the 18 September measure authorized—
11-plus years later—an autopilot war against targets in Pakistan, Yemen,
Somalia, and beyond. Those targets may indeed be enemies of, and
threats to, the United States. But few of the drone war’s intended targets
today—not to mention the unfortunates simply in the wrong place at
the wrong time—“planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.” Underscoring this point,
33     Paul D. Miller, “When will the U.S. drone war end?” The Washington Post, November 17, 2011.
34     Joint Resolution To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the
Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Public Law 107–40, 107th Congress, September 18,
2001, http://www.gpo.gov.
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The Washington Post recently reported that a growing number of drone
strikes in Yemen have targeted “lower-level figures who are suspected of
having links to terrorism operatives but are seen mainly as leaders of
factions focused on gaining territory in Yemen’s internal struggle.”35
(Emphasis added.) Yet the drone war goes on, largely because there are
no Americans in harm’s way—at least not directly.

Developing a Complex

If we argue that drone pilots are not in the battlespace, which seems
reasonable given that most of them are 7,500 miles away from the enemy,
it invites friend and foe alike to draw an unsettling conclusion about
American power. An example from history may be helpful.
Amid the Allied bombing raids on Germany at the end of World
War II, British physicist Patrick Blackett worried that London and
Washington had developed a “Jupiter Complex,” which historian Paul
Johnson describes as “the notion of the Allies as righteous gods, raining
retributive thunderbolts on their wicked enemies.” The Allies concluded,
as Johnson explains, that strategic bombing “was the best way to make
the maximum use of their vast economic resources, while suffering the
minimum manpower losses.”36
UCAVs take the logic of the Jupiter Complex to its ultimate conclusion—maximum use of economic and technological resources with
zero manpower losses and zero risks—all buffered by the virtual-reality
nature of the delivery system. Just consider The New York Times depiction of the inner workings of the drone war, which describes President
Obama as “at the helm of a top-secret ‘nominations’ process to designate terrorists for kill or capture,” authorizing every strike in Yemen
and Somalia and “the more complex and risky strikes in Pakistan,”
often deciding “personally whether to go ahead” with a drone strike,
and acceding to a method for tallying civilian casualties that “in effect
counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants . . . unless
there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.”37
The results are not for the squeamish. The Brookings Institution
estimates that, along with the 2,700-plus militants killed by drones in
Pakistan, some 400 nonmilitants may have been killed.38 The use of
drones to cripple al Awlaki’s Yemeni branch of al Qaeda killed dozens
of people, many of them apparently not affiliated with al Qaeda, including a 16-year-old relative of al Awlaki born in Denver.39 (This incident
raises due-process questions, just as the proliferation of drones deployed
domestically raises Fourth Amendment concerns, but that is beyond the
scope of this article.)
In short, it seems Washington has been seduced by the Jupiter
Complex. Being seen in such a light—as detached and remote in every
sense of the word, especially in waging war—should give Americans
35     Greg Miller, “U.S. drone targets in Yemen raise questions,” The Washington Post, June 2, 2012.
36     Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties (New York: Harper
Perennial, 1992), 402-403.
37     Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,”
The New York Times, May 29, 2012.
38     Livingston and O’Hanlon, 32.
39     Craig Whitlock, “U.S. airstrike that killed American teen in Yemen raises legal, ethical questions,” The Washington Post, October 22, 2011.
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pause. “Reliance on drone strikes allows our opponents to cast our
country as a distant, high-tech, amoral purveyor of death,” argues
Kurt Volker, former US ambassador to NATO. “It builds resentment,
facilitates terrorist recruitment and alienates those we should seek to
inspire.”40 Indeed, what appears a successful counterterrorism campaign
to Americans may look very different to international observers. “In
17 of 20 countries,” a recent Pew survey found, “more than half disapprove of U.S. drone attacks targeting extremist leaders and groups in
nations such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.”41 Moreover, a UN official recently announced plans to create “an investigation unit” within
the Human Rights Council to “inquire into individual drone attacks . . .
in which it has been alleged that civilian casualties have been inflicted.”42
This is not to suggest that either side of the drone debate has a
monopoly on the moral high ground; both have honorable motives.
UCAV advocates want to employ drone technologies to limit US casualties, while UCAV opponents are concerned that these same technologies
could make war too easy to wage. This underscores there exists no simple
solution to the drone dilemma. Converting to a fully unmanned air force
would be dangerous. Putting the UCAV genie back in the bottle, on the
other hand, would be difficult, perhaps impossible.
There are those who argue that it is a false dichotomy to say that
policymakers must choose between UCAVs and manned aircraft. To
be sure, UCAVs could serve as a complement to manned aircraft rather
than a replacement, with pilots in the battlespace wielding UCAVs to
augment their capabilities. That does not, however, appear to be where
we are headed. Consider Admiral Mullen’s comments about the sunset
of manned combat aircraft, the manned-versus-unmanned acquisition trajectories, the remote-control wars in Pakistan and Yemen and
Somalia, and President Obama’s reliance on UCAVs. Earlier this year,
for instance, when France asked for help in its counterassault against
jihadists in Mali, Washington initially offered drones.43 The next president will likely follow and build upon the UCAV precedents set during
the Obama administration, just as the Obama administration has with
the UCAV precedents set during the Bush administration. Recall that
the first shot in the drone war was fired approximately 11 years ago, in
Yemen, when a CIA Predator drone retrofitted with Hellfire missiles
targeted and killed one of the planners of the USS Cole attack.
Given their record and growing capabilities, it seems unlikely that
UCAVs will ever be renounced entirely; however, perhaps the use of
drones for lethal purposes can be curtailed or at least contained. It is
important to recall that the United States has circumscribed its own
military power in the past by drawing the line at certain technologies.
The United States halted development of the neutron bomb in the 1970s
and dismantled its neutron arsenal in the 2000s; agreed to forswear

40     Kurt Volker, “What the U.S. risks by relying on drones,” The Washington Post, October 26, 2012.
41     Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, “Drone Strikes Widely Opposed, Global Opinion of
Obama Slips, International Policies Faulted,” June 13, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org.
42     Colum Lynch, “U.N. to probe drone attacks by U.S., others resulting in civilian deaths,” The
Washington Post, October 25, 2012.
43     Rukmini Callimachi and Baba Ahmed, “A battle to retake north Mali: Hundreds of French
troops drive back al-Qaida-linked rebels,” The Washington Post, January 12, 2013.
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chemical weapons; and renounced biological warfare “for the sake of
all mankind.”44
That brings us back to The New York Times’ portrait of the drone
war. Washington must be mindful that the world is watching. This is
not an argument in defense of international watchdogs tying America
down. The UN secretariat may refuse to recognize America’s special
role, but by turning to Washington whenever civil war breaks out, or
nuclear weapons sprout up, or sea lanes are threatened, or natural disasters wreak havoc, or genocide is let loose, it is tacitly conceding that the
United States is, well, special. Washington has every right to kill those
who are trying to kill Americans. However, the brewing international
backlash against the drone war reminds us that means and methods
matter as much as ends.

Error War

If these geo-political consequences of remote-control war do not get
our attention, then the looming geo-strategic consequences should. If
we make the argument that UCAV pilots are in the battlespace, then we
are effectively saying that the battlespace is the entire earth. If that is the
case, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.
First, if the battlespace is the entire earth, the enemy would seem to
have the right to wage war on those places where UCAV operators are based.
That’s a sobering thought, one few policymakers have contemplated.
Second, power-projecting nations are following America’s lead and
developing their own drones to target their distant enemies by remote.
An estimated 75 countries have drone programs underway.45 Many of
these nations are less discriminating in employing military force than
the United States—and less skillful. Indeed, drones may usher in a new
age of accidental wars. If the best drones deployed by the best military
crash more than any other aircraft in America’s fleet, imagine the accident rate for mediocre drones deployed by mediocre militaries. And then
imagine the international incidents this could trigger between, say, India
and Pakistan; North and South Korea; Russia and the Baltics or Poland
or Georgia; China and any number of its wary neighbors.
China has at least one dozen drones on the drawing board or in production, and has announced plans to dot its coastline with 11 drone bases
in the next two years.46 The Pentagon’s recent reports on Chinese military power detail “acquisition and development of longer-range UAVs
and UCAVs . . . for long-range reconnaissance and strike”; development
of UCAVs to enable “a greater capacity for military preemption”; and
interest in “converting retired fighter aircraft into unmanned combat
aerial vehicles.”47 At a 2011 air show, Beijing showcased one of its newest
44     US Department of State, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
(BWC), April 10, 1972.
45     Jim Michaels, “Experts: Drones basis for new global arms race,” USA Today, January 8, 2013.
46     Jonathan Kaiman and Justin McCurry, “Japan and China step up drone race as tension builds
over disputed islands (drone skirmishes?),” The Guardian, January 9, 2013.
47     US Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” 32; US Department of Defense, “Military Power
of the People’s Republic of China 2007,” 12; US Department of Defense, “Military Power of the
People’s Republic of China 2005,” 4.
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drones by playing a video demonstrating a pilotless plane tracking a US
aircraft carrier near Taiwan and relaying targeting information.48
Equally worrisome, the proliferation of drones could enable nonpower-projecting nations—and nonnations, for that matter—to join the
ranks of power-projecting nations. Drones are a cheap alternative to
long-range, long-endurance warplanes. Yet despite their low cost, drones
can pack a punch. And owing to their size and range, they can conceal
their home address far more effectively than the typical, nonstealthy
manned warplane. Recall that the possibility of surprise attack by drones
was cited to justify the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.49
Of course, cutting-edge UCAVs have not fallen into undeterrable
hands. But if history is any guide, they will. Such is the nature of proliferation. Even if the spread of UCAV technology does not harm the
United States in a direct way, it is unlikely that opposing swarms of
semiautonomous, pilotless warplanes roaming about the earth, striking at will, veering off course, crashing here and there, and sometimes
simply failing to respond to their remote-control pilots will do much to
promote a liberal global order.
It would be ironic if the promise of risk-free war presented by drones
spawned a new era of danger for the United States and its allies.

48     “China building an army of unmanned military drones ‘to rival the U.S.,’” The Daily Mail,
July 5, 2011.
49     “A Policy of Evasion and Deception,” US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the
United Nations on Iraq, The Washington Post, February 5, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com.

